Using MM/FH alone is difficult because the standard is illdefined and to date is not contractually enforceable.
Normally, MM/FH includes all direct maintenance man-hours and organizational and intermediate level maintenance
required to support an aircraft system at a single base. The word all is far too general. Moreover, the maintenance
man-hours calculation methodology at one major command (MAJCOM) or base may not be counted in the same manner as
at another base, or from one aircraft weapon system to another, or even from one defense industry contractor to
another.
Routine scheduled maintenance actions are required on virtually every weapon system. Therefore, a certain level
of maintenance is designed into the system, some more than others, to ensure a degree of reliability. However,
the unprogrammed, unscheduled maintenance actions present the greatest difficulty to maintenance personnel. Scheduled
maintenance would be similar to a routine oil change and tune -up on an automobile, or even long-term normally
anticipated maintenance such as changing tires, air filters, and brake linings. Unscheduled maintenance would be
a broken oil line, water pump, or an axle on an automobile. The problem in aircraft systems is how to identify
unscheduled versus routine scheduled maintenance. One way is by tracking the mean flying hours between unscheduled
maintenance (MFHBUM) which would more clearly identify the actual availability of an aircraft weapon system. To
properly identify maintenance man-hours, both scheduled and unscheduled man-hours must be considered.
Another measuring device is that of system availability. We need a clearly understandable and enforceable standard
or standards by which to identify actual aircraft availability in wartime, Currently, the Air Force is using the
actual experience of various aircraft weapon systems to set availability standards; but, in new weapon systems,
one can often only gwPss what the standard should be. The Air Force should specify before buying what the expected
available sortie rates will be, especially for wartime planning purposes. However, we often buy an aircraft without
knowing in advance how many sorties will be available daily in wartime.
Air Force regulations do not clearly define all these parameters. Statements of need (SON), system operational
capability statements, and program management directives (PMDs) do not routinely define meantime between failure
(MTBF) or meantime between maintenance (MTBM) or the calculation methodologies used, although DPMLs and SPOs are
tasked to ensure they are considered during aircraft design and operational test and evaluation (OT&E).
Enforceable and trackable standards and calculation methodologies are needed not only for the total system but
also for each subsystem within an aircraft. For example, an MTBF needs to be established for the hydraulic system,
the munitions dispensing system, the avionics system, the radar system, the crew-ejection system, the landing gear
system, and the airframe. Each subsystem requirement should be stated and then a cumulative standard for both scheduled
and unscheduled maintenance should be established for the weapon system.
Where will the SPO director, contractor, and DPML obtain these standards and methodologies? A primary source, of
course, is from experience and requirements of older on-line weapon systems. However, this approach will be only
partially adequate as new technologies surface and requirements of weapon system capabilities change significantly.
Logisticians should have readily available studies and analyses within recognized regulations and documents that
provide all the available historical criteria, standards, and methodologies, as well as actual capabilities of
all current and past mainframe weapon systems and subsystems. With this master listing by functional area and subsystem,
the logistics program requirements officer can compare the standards and more readily determine new achievable
levels of reliability, maintainability, and supportability. In fact, it would also be beneficial to include standards
from other services experience.
Establishing standards and requirements is but one step in the process. Whether or not standards are actually translated
into availability depends on the management approach and control systems used in individual aircraft acquisition
programs. Decisions left unanswered at the Air Staff or SPO/DPML level are made at a lower level or left up to
a contractor. The failure to clearly establish requirements and to develop solid management systems to control
programs will inevitably result in cost control and logistics problems later in the acquisition process.
A strong top-down approach is needed, which is where lessons learned from past mistakes can best be implemented.
AFR 57-1, Statement of Operational Need (SON), is where the process begins, and the new edition provides a clearer
outline of this approach with somewhat more detailed programmatic requirements. Once a program has been accepted
as a viable Air Force requirement, the program management directive (PMD) is developed. Unfortunately, PMDs do
not normally incorporate all the requirements of the SON and system operational capability statements. Each iteration
of program development should build upon each previous step in the process, ensuring nothing is lost in the translation.
The PMD should be the complete statement of work from which aircraft weapon system procurement contracts are developed,
although this procedure is not the norm in aircraft acquisition systems today. The PMD is often now merely an overview
of management procedures, responsibilities, and priorities rather than a complete statement of system management
requirements.
One would expect, for example, that an expression of a contractual value for reliability, indeed for any operational
suitability characteristic, would follow and not precede the establishment of an operational standard. But that
was not the case in the F-16 required operational capability (ROC). The rapid pace of the F-16 program as it moved
from flight vehicle technology demonstration to weapon system development resulted in the F-16 ROC becoming a "backfill"
document.
The need to emphasize R&M requirements, starting with milestone zero and proceeding through the full-scale
engineering development (FSED)/production process,. is spelled out in DOD Directives 5000.40 and 5000.39. Reliability
and maintainability program plans and their various elements are defined in MIL-STD-785 and MIL-STD-470. However,
full implementation of these directives varies among different types of equipment and different weapon system programs.
There is little doubt that systems with far greater R&M are achievable, but the overriding issue is the ability
to hold together all the key programmatic aspects of the structure when faced with conflicting demands of funding,
costs, schedule, systems performance, and political constraints.'
Often, development contracts do not reflect what the leadership and program managers at the various levels think
the contractors' requirements should be. Thus, the best intentions of the best program managers are lost in the
shuffle of documents from one level to another. Moreover, what is considered a priority in trade-off management
decisions may not always be the same priority the senior level management believes should be stressed. In other
words, unless the requirements and priorities are clearly stated in each document in extensive detail, there is
no guarantee they will be met when a weapon system is produced. The SPO and DPML must then aggressively pursue
the stated integrated priorities and requirements. The charter and objectives must be quite clear to all, and senior
management must periodically follow up to ensure the stated priorities and requirements are being properly executed.
In conjunction with this approach, a very close association must be established with the prime contractor, using
devices such as award fee incentives and direct Air Force participation in more efficient manufacturing technology
(MANTECH) developments supported by funds made available specifically to the SPOs and DPMLs for these purposes.
Only then will the SPO and DPML be able to apply enough pressure to ensure their respective requirements are met.
Some will say this overview is again merely a restatement of how the Air Force acquisition system works now; so
what is newt The fact is this is how well-run programs are sometimes managed. They are not the norm, as evident
in various programs experiencing limited wartime supportability, low sortie rates, increased manpower requirements
for new aircraft versus older models, increased intermediate level maintenance requirements, or excessive spares
costs and requirements due to low system reliability. Fixing part of the problem is helpful but a whole new management
thrust is needed to ensure the Air Force is provided cost-effective, reliable, maintainable, and supportable aircraft
weapon systems. Until the management approach, requirements process, and inspection procedures are fully institutionalized
and documented, acquisition problems and follow-on wartime availability difficulties wilt remain.
Recapping The Problem
The four parts of the problem are:
(1) System requirements are often vague and _ lack definition, leaving the resulting reliability; . maintainabii'ity,
and supportability standards to the judgment of contract design engineers.
(2) Program management documents are not sufficiently detailed, objectives and requirements are often lost when
translated from one document to another, and priorities are not always in agreement between various agencies.
(3) Funds are not normally made available for the purpose of providing award fee incentives to specifically cover
R&M system requirements.
(4) Inspection and audit management follow-up is sporadic and full top-down management reviews are often somewhat
limited.
A comprehensive fix is required for a comprehensive problem. But one thing is certain, the weapon system availability
problem will not improve in the short run without attention.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are proposed to solve the problems:
(1) Definitive requirements development standards should be established.
(a) Clearly defined and universally understood calculation methodologies and comprehensive definitions are required
for mean flying hours between scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, maintenance man-hours per flying hour, maintenance
man-hours per sortie, mean downtime, mean time between maintenance, maximum repair time. mean man-hours to repair,
mean time between demand, mean time between critical failure, and the other applicable measurements relating to
availability.
(b) Calculation methodologies and readily understandable definitions should be incorporated into a single all-encompassing
regulation. (The glossary included in this AFJL is a first attempt at bringing together appropriate definitions.
Methodologies developed must be applicable at base level, major command, and the contractor.)
(c) Reliability, maintainability, and supportability standards and criteria applied to all current and past mainframe
weapon systems should be consolidated into one document outlining the historical capabilities and methodologies,
including those for subsystems, used by all services to the extent available.
(2) A detailed management system approach with a full documentation process should be developed.
(a) A step-by-step, top-down management approach needs to be described in an all-encompassing regulation. Several
applicable regulations need to be consolidated into a single Air Force management regulation.
(b) New management approaches need to be documented, aligning the various program systems documents and ensuring
each successive product fully incorporates the previous listed requirements, management concepts, priorities, and
controls.
(c) Air Staff, SPO, DPML, MAJCOM, and contractor relationships and responsibilities in the process need to be stated
in the all-encompassing regulation.
(d) The PMD must specifically address in a regulation and each PMD the priority of R&M relative to system performance,
costs, schedule, and security.
(e) Management emphasis must be clearly documented demanding early incorporation of R&M requirements into engineering
design long before critical design review, but not later than immediately following initial program go ahead. (3)
A specific funding profile should be required at the beginning of a weapon system development to clearly support
growth and maturation of R&M through FSED and early production.
(4) A comprehensive weapon system acquisition inspection, audit, and management oversight follow-up and feedback
system should be incorporated within one allencompassing Air Force regulation.
(a) Air Force inspection requirements, criteria, and standards for the Air Staff, SPO, DPML, and MAJCOM program
managers need to be incorporated to ensure R&M requirements are followed in a consistent and effective manner.
(b) Air Force Audit Agency involvement, procedures, and program participation need to be clearly defined to ensure
R&M requirements are followed in a consistent, effective, and efficient manner.
(c) Management reports (a feedback system) must be developed to cover all aspects of reliability, maintainability,
and supportability.
(d) Program management review (PMR) requirements (oversight) must be specified, including areas to be discussed,
management approach, priorities, program studies planned and in progress, participants, and frequency.
General James P. Mullins, former Commander, Air Force Logistics Command, at the Air Force Association National
Symposium on Logistics, 7-8 October 1984, addressed the issue forcefully. He stated the increasing reliance on
high technology systems, combined with the "come-as-you-are" nature of modern warfare, creates a circumstance
in which:
. . . the tail, in the form of logistics, will more and more wag the dog. Logistics will increasingly become the
single greatest impediment to having real combat capability. We'd better find a way to cope with this reality until
we can ultimately remove this impediment, hopefully by removing the need for logistics itself. The notion of building
systems that don't need logistics, except for consumables like fuel and munitions . . . isn't pie in the sky. In
fact, to a great extent, we already have this technology. The 2,000 hour MTBF is not a fantasy of the future it's
a reality today.
Conclusion
The Air Force has recognized the need and made the commitment to institutionalize R&M in the weapon system
acquisition process. On 17 September 1984, the Honorable Verne Orr, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Charles
A. Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, signed an action memorandum setting up an Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff
(DCS) Research, Development, and Acquisition and DCS Logistics and Engineering working group to develop an action
plan. Some elements of the concepts outlined within this paper have also subsequently been recommended by the working
group, although with a significantly different approach on the issue. The bottom line objectives, however, are
similar.
The future can be bright for high sortie-producing weapons with a commitment to systematically institutionalize
the concepts outlined herein. The systems management approach and options selected by the Air Force will have a
significant impact on the near-term success of the initiative. The institutionalizing concepts proposed in this
paper could additionally prove highly beneficial in the short run and, most importantly, provide for the high degree
of weapon system R&M the Air Force requires in the future. The upfront investment in time and money is worth
the effort.
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